By Caroline Glick August 20, 2010
A troubling milestone arrived on Thursday when the US withdrew its final combat brigade from Iraq. The remaining 50,000 US forces are charged with advising and training the Iraqi military. President Barack Obama has pledged to withdraw them as well by the end of next year.
When US-led allied forces invaded Iraq seven years ago, their action
raised the hopes and incited the dreams of millions throughout the
region and throughout the world.
Operation Iraqi Freedom promised to bring the light of liberty to a
corner of the world that had known none. By doing so, it was supposed to
inspire and enable men and women throughout the region to believe that
they too could be free.
But as the last US combat brigade departed on Thursday, the Iraq they
left behind was not an Arab shining city on an Iraqi hill. The Iraq they
withdrew from has no government.
The post-March 7 elections coalition talks are hopelessly deadlocked.
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has agreed to serve as the head of a
caretaker government for now and take no major decisions about Iraq's
future. In a word, Iraq suffers from governmental paralysis.
Then there is the US-trained and -armed Iraqi military. Recently, Iraq's
most senior general, Lt.-Gen. Babakir Zebari, acknowledged that Iraqi
forces will be unable to defend the country from domestic and foreign
aggression until 2020. Zebari asserted that the reason the withdrawal of
US combat forces was proceeding well was "because they [the US
forces] are still here."
This week's suicide bombing at the military recruitment office in
Baghdad in which some 61 people were murdered is part of a growing trend
in Iraq. As the US withdraws, the forces the US fought throughout the
past seven years are on the rise. Al-Qaida is reportedly behind much of
the recent violence as it seeks to convince Iraq's uneasy Sunnis to
rejoin its ranks in a continuing war against the Shi'ites. And as for
the Shi'ites, their leaders remain alternatively and often
simultaneously dependent on and threatened by Iran.
As outgoing US commander in Iraq Gen. Ray Odierno acknowledged last
month, Iran remains the largest sponsor of sectarian violence in the
country.
And so, despite the US investment of more than a trillion dollars in
Iraq, and despite the more than 4,400 US servicemen and women who lost
their lives in the country, the future of Iraq remains uncertain at
best. Certainly a coherent, moderate, US-allied and democratic Iraq
remains an elusive goal.
The US blames Iran for Iraq's political deadlock.
It is right to do so. The election results gave a narrow two-seat lead
to former prime minister Ayad Alawi's Sunni-backed Iraqiya party over
Maliki's State of Law Shi'ite coalition.
And yet, rather than accept the results, Iranian-allied Shi'ite
politicians led by Ahmed Chalabi sued to have six members of Alawi's
party denied the right to assume office due to their past ties to
Saddam's Ba'athist party.
Although the lawsuit was defeated in May, the sides continue to be
unable to come to an agreement that would enable the Iraqi parliament to
come into office or a government to be formed.
Iran's hand is everywhere in this chaos. As George Friedman wrote in a
recent Straffor Intelligence Bulletin, it is true that today, with
50,000 US forces still deployed in Iraq, "the Iranians do not have
the ability to impose a government on Iraq. However, they do have the
ability to prevent the formation of a government or to destabilize one
that is formed. Iranian intelligence has sufficient allies and
resources in Iraq to guarantee the failure of any stabilization attempt
that doesn't please Tehran."
As Friedman notes, for Iran, keeping Iraq in an ongoing state of
instability, with sporadic periods of outright chaos, is a low-cost,
high-return investment. It denies Iraq the ability to reconstitute
itself in its traditional role as a regional counterweight balancing
Iranian power in the Persian Gulf. It also denies the US victory, erodes
its will to fight and saps it of its determination to defend the Persian
Gulf from Iranian ascendance.
As Friedman sees it, "The Iranian strategy seems to be to make the
United States sufficiently uncomfortable to see withdrawal as attractive
but not to be so threatening as to deter the withdrawal.
"As clever as that strategy is, however, it does not hide the fact that Iran would dominate the Persian Gulf region after the withdrawal. Thus, the United States has nothing but unpleasant choices in Iraq. It can stay in perpetuity and remain vulnerable to violence. It can withdraw and hand the region over to Iran. It can go to war with yet another Islamic country. Or it can negotiate with a government that it despises - and which despises it right back."
There are two frustrating aspects to Friedman's analysis and what it
tells us about the prospects for the region going forward.
THE FIRST frustrating aspect of Friedman's diagnosis of the situation in
Iraq today is just how similar it is to the situation in Lebanon.
As in Iraq, anti-Iranian political forces won the Lebanese elections
last year. And as is the case today in Iraq, Iran's proxies in Lebanon
gridlocked coalition negotiations, and so coerced the anti-Iranian March
14 movement candidates led by Prime Minister Saad Hariri to agree to
forge a unity government with Hizbullah. Moreover, they forced Hariri to
accept effective Hizbullah - that is, Iranian - control over his
government. This they did by demanding that Hizbullah receive enough
votes in the cabinet to give it a veto over all governmental decisions.
Hizbullah's dominant position in Lebanon was depressingly and tragically
demonstrated last week, when Hariri called on the UN to investigate
Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah's allegations that Israel was behind
his father's assassination in 2005. Former prime minister Rafik Hariri's
murder in February 2005 was carried out by Hizbullah and Syria, and his
son knows this.
That he would bow to his father's murderer is a hair raising example of
how the ruthless Iranian power game works. Lebanon's hapless prime
minister rightly fears Hizbullah, Syria and Iran more than he trusts the
US. And so he remains prime minister in name only and serves at their
pleasure - the effective slave of his father's killers.
On a military level, the US's inconclusive campaign in Iraq bears
striking similarities to Israel's departure from southern Lebanon 10
years ago. In Lebanon, as in Iraq for the US, Iran and its proxies made
it impossible for Israel and its allies in the South Lebanese Army to
bring stability to the south. Hizbullah's constant but low-key assaults
on Israel and IDF forces, punctuated by sporadic escalations, eroded the
Israeli ruling class's will to fight. So, too, the elusive character of
the asymmetric enemy made it easy for the same elites to ignore the
nature of the adversarial forces arrayed against Israel and so paved the
way for Israel's retreat. This in turn fomented Hizbullah's triumphant
takeover of the south, and in due course, its takeover of the whole of
Lebanon.
THE SECOND frustrating aspect of the state of Iraq today is what it says
about the US's ability to acknowledge the realities of the region and
fashion successful strategies for contending with its challenges.
For the past seven years, advocates of the Iraq war and opponents of the
war, Republicans and Democrats alike, have consistently refused to
understand the nature of the battlefield and what that meant about their
prospects in Iraq and the region.
Both the Bush and Obama administrations wrongly characterized Iraq as a
stand-alone war. But the fact is that Iraq has always been a
battleground of a regional war. And the main enemy in Iraq, the main
obstacle to stability and victory, is Iran. Just as Israel was unable to
beat Iran in Lebanon, and so lost to its proxy Hizbullah, so the US has
been and will remain unable to defeat Iran in Iraq. And if it maintains
its current strategy, it will be defeated by Iran's proxies.
The only way to safeguard Iraq is to overthrow the regime in Iran. The
only way to get the likes of Hariri out from under the jackboots of
Hizbullah and the Iranian-proxy regime in Damascus is to overthrow the
regime in Iran.
If it were just a question of Iraq's well-being as a country, it would
arguably make sense for the US to avoid escalation of the war and refuse
to challenge the regime in Teheran.
But Iran is not only fighting for Iraq and it is not only fighting in
Iraq. Through its proxies, Iran is also fighting in Lebanon and is using
its proxies to increase its influence throughout the Persian Gulf, the
Levant and beyond.
And with the regime just a short step or two away from nuclear
capabilities it is clear that the US strategy in Iraq was wrong all
along. It was wrong and dangerous.
The US strategy was to bring democracy to Iraq and by doing so, inspire
democratic revolutions throughout the Arab world.
Although inspiring, it was wrong first and foremost because it was
predicated on ignoring one of the basic dictates of strategy. It failed
to recognize that there were other forces in the region.
It failed to anticipate that every US move would be countered by an
Iranian move. And in failing to recognize this basic strategic truth -
even though it has been staring them in the face - the Americans
aggressively pursued a strategy that became more and more irrelevant as
time went by.
As the actions of the Hariris of Lebanon and their counterparts in Iraq
show clearly, Iran's counter-moves have always been more forthright and
compelling than the US's moves have been.
In the September issue of Commentary, Arthur Herman depressingly
sets out the Obama administration's declared plans and early moves to
gut the US military. It is obvious that regardless of Obama's political
position after the mid-term elections in November, he will not revisit
the US's current Middle East strategy, which is predicated on ignoring
the Iranian nuclear elephant in the middle of the room. He will not work
to overthrow the regime or support any forces that would overthrow the
regime.
It is true that in the short term, the prospects for the region hinge on
whether or not Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has the courage to
order the IDF to attack Iran's nuclear installations. And it is also
true that if an Israeli strike is sufficiently successful, it would
empower many positive forces throughout the region - from Teheran and
Kurdistan to Ankara, Damascus and Beirut.
But in the medium and long term, nothing can replace America. And as
long as the US continues on its trajectory of strategic blindness, the
Iraqis will be far from alone in their suffering.
Originally published in The Jerusalem Post.