U.S. Policy on Hizballah: The Question
of Engagement
By Ash
Jain
July 14, 2010
Four years ago this week, Israel launched a military campaign in Lebanon in
retaliation for a brazen Hizballah attack on its soldiers. The goal, according
to an Israeli official, was "to put Hizballah out of business." But
neither war nor subsequent U.S. diplomatic efforts aimed at weakening the
group have succeeded, and some in the Obama administration now appear to view
direct engagement as an option worth exploring. Reaching out to Hizballah,
however, at a time when it is politically and military emboldened, would be an
exercise in futility that could prove counterproductive.
Current Efforts
Since the end of the 2006 war, the United States has sought to counter
Hizballah by advancing three main policy goals: an end to arms transfers,
disarmament, and full Lebanese government control over its territory (i.e., an
end to Hizballah's "state within a state"). Washington's approach to
achieving these goals has remained largely consistent through both the Bush
and Obama administrations.
First, the United States has maintained its support for the March 14 political
coalition, which has opposed Hizballah's status as an armed militia. Second,
Washington has spent considerable sums to strengthen the Lebanese government's
capacity, committing more than $600 million in security assistance and an
additional $500 million for civilian assistance programs since 2006. Third,
the United States has strengthened efforts to stigmatize the group and
constrain its financial activities by expanding the list of Hizballah
associates designated under Executive Order 13224. Finally, Washington has
sought to minimize popular support for Hizballah by pressing, to varying
degrees, for the resolution of outstanding grievances, including Israeli
overflights and control over Ghajar and Shebaa Farms.
These efforts appeared to bear fruit in June 2009, when Hizballah's political
alliance failed to capture a majority of seats during parliamentary elections.
Yet the group's electoral defeat did not translate into diminishing political
power. To the contrary, after attaining an effective blocking minority in the
cabinet, Hizballah has consolidated its influence and strengthened its
legitimacy as an armed resistance movement. March 14 has all but fractured,
and Hizballah now stands as the region's most powerful substate actor -- with
a larger and more sophisticated military arsenal and greater political
influence than at any time since its inception.
Limits of Engagement
Recognizing the limits of current U.S. policy, advocates of engagement contend
that now is the time to pursue an alternative approach. In May, Deputy
National Security Advisor John Brennan suggested that outreach to certain
elements of Hizballah could lead to the group's ideological moderation.
According to media reports, a recently leaked U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
"red team" assessment sets forth a similar line of thinking.
Although neither Brennan's comments (which have since been walked back) nor
the CENTCOM paper appear to reflect a formal reconsideration of U.S. policy,
they indicate that interest in this option is growing.
Such arguments, however, rely on two fundamentally misguided premises. First,
Hizballah's willingness to participate in the political process is often cited
as evidence of a move away from its violent underpinnings. In fact, the group
remains as committed as ever to its role as an armed resistance movement. In
its updated manifesto, released in 2009 and seen by some observers as a sign
of moderation, Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah reaffirmed his rejection of
Israel ("we categorically reject any compromise with Israel or
recognizing its legitimacy") and proclaimed the resistance to be a
continuing "national necessity."
Terrorism, violence, and intimidation remain key strategic assets for
Hizballah, not just against Israel, but against the state of Lebanon itself.
The group's May 2008 takeover of Beirut shattered the myth that it would never
use arms against the Lebanese people. Moreover, if the Special Tribunal on
Lebanon's reported suspicions of Hizballah involvement in the murder of former
prime minister Rafiq Hariri are validated, it would make clear that Hizballah
has no qualms in turning its well-honed skills of lethal assassination against
its domestic political opponents. The organization also seeks to co-opt the
Lebanese Armed Forces into serving as an arm of the resistance and seems
determined to use any means necessary to expand its control over the state.
The second mistaken premise is that Hizballah has moved away from its historic
animosity toward the United States. Although the group has been careful in
recent years to avoid any direct provocation, it remains committed to
challenging the United States and its interests in the region. Its 2009
manifesto reemphasized the movement's anti-American foundations first outlined
in 1985, expanding the rationale for resistance as a response to U.S.
"terror" and plans for "dominating the nations [of the Arab and
Islamic world] politically, economically, culturally and through all
aspects."
There is little evidence that Nasrallah or anyone around him seeks to alter
Hizballah's strategic orientation or loosen its close alliance with Iran and
Syria. U.S. engagement would only validate the organization's increasing
capabilities and boost its domestic and international legitimacy. It would
also further weaken what is left of the democratically elected pro-Western
government in Beirut. More broadly, such a fundamental shift in policy would
signal Washington's diminishing resolve to confront terrorism and undermine
its long-held stance against rewarding terrorist groups for their actions.
A More Robust Approach
Rather than pursuing engagement, U.S. officials should instead look to
intensify efforts aimed at constraining Hizballah's activities and limiting
its destabilizing influence. Although increased pressure on Hizballah could
provoke a violent backlash, the organization will only increase in strength
and move closer toward its long-term aims unless concerted action is taken
against it. A more robust approach would involve the following measures:
Increasing pressure on Syria and Iran. To raise the
costs of support for Hizballah, the United States should mount a campaign to
impose UN sanctions on Syria for clear violations of Security Council
Resolution 1701, which prohibits arms transfers to Hizballah. Likewise, it
should press for sanctions against Iran for violating Resolution 1747's
prohibition on arms transfers. (Three violations have been referred to a UN
sanctions committee, but with no follow-up action.) Such a campaign would also
help legitimize potential airstrikes against Syrian facilities along the
Lebanon border should transfers of Scud missiles or other sophisticated
weapons continue.
Conditioning Hizballah's role in government. U.S.
officials should begin discussions with allies in Lebanon and the region
regarding conditions for Hizballah's continuing participation in a national
unity government, similar to the Quartet principles imposed on Hamas. Such
conditions could include a renunciation of violence, concrete steps toward
disarmament, and recognition of the Lebanese government's authority. Although
initiating such discussions may not have any immediate impact, it could help
reset expectations regarding Hizballah's future role in government and lead to
reconsideration of the issue at the next politically opportune moment (e.g.,
if the special tribunal issues indictments against Hizballah operatives).
Empowering independent Shiites. Weakening Hizballah will require
breaking the monopoly that both it and its allies have over the Shiite
community in Lebanon. The Obama administration should build on its
predecessor's efforts to reach out to independent Shiite activists and
strengthen their ability to forge an alternative political movement. For
example, Washington could facilitate access to funding and encourage stronger
links between moderate Shiites in Lebanon, Iraq, and other communities across
the region.
Enhancing coordination with allies. With tensions
between Israel and Hizballah rising, the United States should initiate
consultations with Israel -- and, separately, with Arab allies that share its
concerns, such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia -- to lay the groundwork for
a common diplomatic approach in the event that conflict breaks out. Washington
should make clear that it will stand by Israel if the latter is forced to act
against Hizballah's military capabilities, but will also seek to limit actions
that could undermine the government or pro-Western forces in Lebanon.
Conclusion
While testifying before Congress last month, Assistant Secretary of State
Jeffrey Feltman emphasized that the United States "will not deal with or
have any contact with" Hizallah. Given the futility of such outreach,
this is a sound position to maintain. Engagement could merit consideration at
some point in the future, when the group has been weakened and appears willing
to accept a meaningful accommodation. But, until then, a more comprehensive
and vigorous approach to counter Hizballah's expanding influence would better
serve Washingtwon's interests.
Ash
Jain, a former member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, is
a visiting fellow at The Washington Institute.