'THE ISRAEL LOBBY'
To the Editor:
Every time an academic writes about "the Israel lobby," invariably something is missing. Whether it is Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer grossly exaggerating the lobby's power, or David Verbeeten minimizing it in the Fall 2006 Middle East Quarterly ("How Important Is the Israel Lobby?"), there is deficiency in analysis. Few academics have a clue about how Washington works, how lobbyists interact with Congress, or how policy decisions are made. Nor do those in the Ivory Tower have a feel for how Congress can influence foreign policy and its relationship to both public opinion and the executive branch.
When writing about lobbying and the political process, it helps to have had some hands-on experience in both our foreign policy bureau-cracies and on Capitol Hill. Otherwise, it is too easy to be off the mark in determining how policies can be influenced by outside interest groups. Verbeeten, for instance, states that, "Between 1973 and 1987, AIPAC knew more failure than success in influencing key U.S. decisions." While this may be true in some instances on a macro scale, many of the pro-Israel lobby's successes have gone unnoticed or unreported. Between 1974 and 1980, when I was executive director of AIPAC, we had quite a few successes. For example, little has been made public about the technological limitations placed on the F-15 aircraft sold to Saudi Arabia in 1978 and similarly on the AWACS aircraft the Saudis purchased in 1981. When I met with Jordan's late King Hussein in Washington a year before he died, he confirmed that the Hawk missiles we supplied him in the mid-1970s were still set in concrete. The PLK—or "plucky little king" as he was referred to in State Department cables— knew full well that it was congressional pressure that led to restrictions on the missiles' mobility in order to prevent them from being any threat to Israel's air dominance.
There was also the harsh congressional criticism of the "Rogers Plan" of December 1969 calling for an imposed settlement whereby Israel essentially would return to its pre-1967 borders; the 1970 Senate initiative authorizing the first military credits for Israel, and congressional pressure on the Nixon administration to deliver F-4 Phantom jets to Israel, aircraft which later bore the brunt of the air war in 1973.
Why would Verbeeten have any knowledge of another instance where AIPAC cut a deal offering not to fight U.S. aid to Syria in the late 1970s in exchange for three times as much assistance for Israel in addition to the amount that the administration had already budgeted? Also during this period and subsequently, Congress has consistently added billions in economic and military aid to Israel above and beyond administration requests—something unheard of with regard to foreign aid appropriations, which for most countries meant the axe rather than the ladle. There are two other major accomplishments that go unmentioned in Verbeeten's article: the Jackson-Vanik Freedom of Emigration Act and the Senate "Letter of 76." Both merit elaboration. Under the leadership of the late Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson, and over the strenuous objections of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. who was pushing détente with the Soviet Union. Congress passed landmark legislation denying trade benefits to Soviet Russia unless it permitted Soviet Jews to leave. This effort spearheaded by the National Conference on Soviet Jewry and the organized American Jewish community constituted a decisive defeat for the administration and a boon for Israel.
Then, in May 1975, Kissinger, frustrated by his inability to wring further concessions from Israel during his shuttle diplomacy between Israel and Egypt, announced that there would be a "reassessment" of U.S. relations with Israel. Given Israel's growing dependence on U.S. support, this threat was countered by a strong bipartisan letter of support signed in just a few days by seventy-six U.S. senators. In their letter, the senators made it clear that Israel was not to blame for the collapse of the talks with Egypt. And they were quite specific in asserting that any delay in U.S. arms shipments to Israel was "dangerous."'
A clear call for closer U.S. cooperation with Israel has been a staple over the years of the congressional message to various administrations along with disdain for "even-handed" policies when it came to dealing with Israel and its Arab foes. Congress has consistently insisted on treating Israel as a friend and ally. The bipartisan support this position continues to enjoy today is no small feat in an increasingly fractious and partisan Congress. Lopsided congressional votes favoring Israel have become a fact of political life.
While Verbeeten is correct in stating that it is an "exaggeration" to say that the role of the Israel lobby in U.S.-Israel relations is "salient, decisive, and unique," still, the lobby has been successful in working with Congress to counter the State Department's predisposition to favor the interests of the numerous Arab and Muslim countries with which it interacts. Success is not measured in achieving positive results in every instance, for example, in moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, but also by imposing self-limitations on an unsympathetic bureaucracy.
Ultimately, the real underpinning of "the lobby's" success is the fact that most Americans consider a secure Israel to be in the best interests of the United States. Americans acknowledge that Israel is more like us than are its neighbors. This is what really drives U.S. policies in the region. And helping steer this course are many thousands of Jewish and non-Jewish Americans who insist on having their voices heard and who enthusiastically participate in our democratic process. To my mind then, the truth about the influence of "the lobby" lies somewhere between being an all-powerful force and being largely irrelevant. While it is neither of these, it is undoubtedly a force to be reckoned with by our policymakers.
Morris J. Amitay Washington, D.C.2
1 "Senate letter to President Ford," Near East Report. May 28, 1975.
2 Morris J. Amitay is a former Foreign Service officer, House and Senate aide, and executive director of AIPAC from 1974 to 1980. He is now vice chair of JINSA, founder of the (pro-Israel) Washington PAC, and heads a lobbying/law firm on Capitol Hill specializing in national security issues.
David Verbeeten responds:
Mr. Amitay has inadvertently misconstrued my article. I do not say the contemporary Israel lobby is irrelevant, but rather I provide historical context for that influence which it now does exert. This influence is contingent upon a preexisting receptivity on the part of government officials to listen to pro-Israel arguments. I agree with Mr. Amitay that Congress reflects the pro-Israel attitude of the American people. This explains why Congress tends to support Israel despite, not because of, lobby pressure.
The point of my article was to demonstrate beyond any doubt that Walt and Mearsheimer's argument that the Israel lobby directs the Congress is ludicrous. AIPAC should be commended for its hard work. Its lobbying was essential to the passage of the Jackson-Vanik Freedom of Emigration Act and the issuance of the Senate Letter of 76. But, what empowered AIPAC so much was the fact that, after the Six Day war especially, most policymakers sought close U.S.-Israel ties. The desire for close ties bolstered AIPAC more than AIPAC bolstered the desire for close ties. It was this symbiosis between mood and the efforts of AIPAC to tap that mood that helped advance strong relations, even under a president like Nixon who was apathetic to the Jewish community and Israel.