Column for April 5, 2005
Morris J. Amitay
How does one make sense of all the talk about the “democratic revolution” that seems to be sweeping the planet, not only in the Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan – but also now supposedly spreading to the Middle East? It has been pointed out that in less than thirty years we have seen the rise of between seventy and eighty new democracies. If there is now the beginning of a second wave, could it also engulf the Arab world? To some extent the recent focus on democratization can be attributed to the fact that President Bush’s foreign policy handbook appears to have been borrowed from Natan Sharansky, the former Soviet dissident and currently a Knesset Member. The short answer is that it is really too early to tell if the democracy glass is half full or half empty.
Pessimists about the spread of democracy in the Middle East will surely be pleasantly surprised if they are proven wrong. But the fact remains that there are strong arguments that can be made that movement toward genuine democracy will have a much rougher road to travel in the Middle East, than elsewhere. This is based on an admittedly politically incorrect assumption that most Arabs will not acclimate to democratic practices and a civil society as easily as European or Asian counterparts. While this is not due to some kind of genetic defect, there are, however, distinct cultural and religious differences which support a more jaundiced view of democracy’s prospects.
Submission to religious authority is a key factor in Koranic teachings – as is the admiration for a strong, powerful leader. This does not mean that as individuals, Arabs do not desire decent living conditions and material well-being. But shackled by educational systems which prevent them from competing in the global economy, and with the emphasis on religious teachings, the current young generation in the Arab world will need more than just the right to vote in sham elections every few years. Modernization and attainment of the benefits of a civil society must accompany democratic reform. So far, there is scant evidence that despite the rumblings in Beirut and Cairo, real change will come about in the near future.
The lack of educational and economic opportunities was largely not present in the Rose or Orange revolutions, and remains an obstacle in generating greater freedom and democracy in the Middle East. In almost all of the Arab countries autocracy may be viewed as a family affair, where “the son also rises”. Whether it is in the monarchies of Morocco, the UAE, Bahrain, and Jordan, or the dictatorships of Syria, Libya and Egypt (Saudi Arabia still hasn’t run out of elderly royal brothers), we have seen sons replacing or being groomed to replace despotic fathers.
In these countries where the ruler really rules, the trappings of an advisory council or a powerless parliament are mere window dressing and examples of “Potemkin” democracy. In Iran, for example, there is an “elected” Parliament whose candidates must first be vetted by a council of clerics who disqualified hundreds from running in the last parliamentary and presidential elections. This blatant denial of freedom of choice, however, did not prevent former Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, from declaring Iran a democracy in Senate testimony. One must assume that the “axis of evil” has been removed from Foggy Bottom’s lexicon.
In Egypt, “President for life” Mubarak (24 years and counting) was sufficiently embarrassed to make a recent concession to actually permit someone other than himself to run in the next Presidential election. But can there be any doubt that the Egyptian dictator with full control over all the organs of state and the media will not be able to extend his rule for another six-year term – that is, barring the intercession of Divine Providence? And although his son, Gamal (“Jimmy”), has recently stated he will not run (obviously, because dad will be on the ballot), it is an open secret that he is being groomed for succession, just as Syria’s Bashar Assad was, and as Libya’s Seif Gadaffi is now being prepared to take over.
What eventually could break the iron grip of the dictators are the powerful images of human freedom being beamed by television – among them, the unintended consequence of Al-jazeera showing the Iraqi elections – and the growing influence of communication over the internet. But in the much shorter run, a powerful influence will be how the Iraqis and the Palestinians perform in the next few months. As for Iraq, the jury is still out on their experiment in democracy as three distinct political/tribal entities – Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis wrangle over the division of power while an insurgency still rages. With regard to the Palestinians, Abu Mazen has yet to seriously try to assert his authority over armed terrorists who roam freely. The key here is whether Hamas and Islamic Jihad will be disarmed, or be permitted to bring their devotion to terrorism with them into the emerging Palestinian security structure. Incorporating terrorists into the new Palestinian security forces ensures that terrorism against Israel will continue – just as it is impossible to teach a lion to be a vegetarian. At this point, the prospect of a more democratic and peaceful Iraq looks like a better bet than a truly reformed, functioning Palestinian entity.
A great deal depends upon our nation’s ability to spread the message of freedom and democracy, and more importantly, to back it up with more than rhetoric. Iran is a notable example where next to nothing is being done to support the dissidents there, as fruitless negotiations drag on with a ruthless regime intent on developing nuclear weapons. It still is unclear whether the “realists” in our foreign policy establishment calling for accommodation, or democracy advocates seeking change, will prevail. US policy will most probably wind up tacking between both approaches – bolstering a non-democratic ally when considered necessary, or undermining an autocratic regime if there is a probability of success. But while tolerating dictatorships will be decided on a case-by-case basis, our strategic objective must be the active promotion of democracy and human freedom. The ultimate goal must be to bring about regime change in the Arab world, preferably by peaceful means. But this does not mean – as the CIA has long practiced - replacing a thuggish general with a corrupt colonel. Instead, it must mean as Sharansky advocates - “unleashing the power of freedom to overcome tyranny and terror”. This, indeed, will be no easy task – but does America really have a choice?