Column for June 14, 2005

Morris J. Amitay

For those looking for simple, straightforward solutions to the problems of the Middle East, the best advice is fuggedaboudit!  But what you can count on is that the challenges to policy-makers will continue to seem insurmountable.

 For the Arab rulers in the region, the name of the game is how to remain in power – at all costs.  These costs, of course, are invariably borne by their own populations.  A prime example is Egypt’s “President for Life” Mubarak, who will be seeking yet a fifth consecutive term.  He keeps his military happy by purchasing billions of dollars of sophisticated weaponry with his annual American aid dollars instead of providing economic benefits to 78 million mostly impoverished Egyptians.  But, some argue that unless Mubarak retains control, the radical Muslim Brotherhood could take over if free elections were permitted.  So how much pressure do we put on Egypt to institute democratic reforms?  Can we really control the forces for change in the Land of the Nile if we push too hard too fast? 

 This same fear undoubtedly motivated the President’s recent strong statements of support for Mahmoud Abbas, the “democratically elected” Palestinian leader who has now had to postpone scheduled July 17 elections.  Behind this indefinite delay is the real concern that Hamas’ popularity (and extremist views) would prevail at the ballot box.  Would the United States then accept Hamas terrorists as legitimate, democratically elected leaders?  Obviously, “one election, one time” is not the kind of democracy and civil society we wish to propagate in the Arab world.  But what do you do if the bad guys come out on top? 

 As we said at the beginning – there are really no easy answers.  But what you can rely upon is that Hamas will stick to its ultimate goal of the elimination of the Jewish State.  Add to this the current Palestinian leadership’s stubborn refusal to use force against its terrorist brothers or to disarm them and you have a real problem.  If Abbas is unwilling or, as he claims, unable to crack down, is there any real hope for crafting an enduring peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians?  This is a very basic question – which will have to be answered before too long.

 In Iran we are watching a race between two time lines.  The first is the time when Iran is able to produce a deliverable nuclear weapon.  This is measured against the time when regime change could occur, and the Iranian people gain their freedom from the current mullahcracy.  Can negotiations and incentives halt Iran’s quest for nukes?  Or will military action against suspected sites be needed to stop the nuclear clock?  What would be the effect of precision strikes (by either Israel or the U.S.) on Iran’s population at large?  Will it galvanize support for the regime – or, can you rely on a recent poll which had 42% of respondents stating that the Islamic Republic’s acquiring nuclear weapons would add to their anxiety?  Again, there are no clear answers here.  But what must be considered a certainty is that the ruling mullahs are hell-bent on having the bomb, and it is equally certain that a large majority of Iranians want greater freedom.

 Pursuing the right objectives in the face of uncertainties also bedevils Israel’s policy-makers, witnessed by the deep divisions within Israeli society over the planned disengagement from Gaza.  Will this unilateral withdrawal bring greater security, or more violence and increased peril to Israel’s citizens?  We see public support for Sharon’s bold gamble diminishing as moving day approaches, and Palestinian rocket attacks continuing.  Here, too, there are no easy answers. 

 If the anxieties unleashed by the national trauma over disengagement were not enough to produce headlines in Israel, there has also been a farcical example of  “Israeli style” politics of personal destruction.  While we adhere to the late Speaker Tip O’Neil’s dictum that all politics is local – in Israel, it seems that all politics appear to be personal.  This has been highlighted recently by the attempts of a rather mediocre Foreign Minister to sack an effective Israeli ambassador in Washington, for what boils down to purely personal reasons. 

 I have never met Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom, but I have known and have had ongoing relationships with every Israeli Ambassador to Washington beginning with the late Itzhak Rabin.  From this vantage point over the past three years I have observed a hard working, articulate envoy who stacks up very well compared to his predecessors, and who represents his country here well.  In a tiny nation where the degree of separation is so compressed, petty personal pique too often prevails over what is good for the country.

 A compelling observation about this diplomatic fiasco was the Jerusalem Report’s Hirsh Goodman’s comment that “Hopefully, however, it will serve to cast an intense spotlight on the Foreign Ministry, whose professional standard is of critical importance to Israel, an office for building relations with other countries, not destroying them through stupidity.”  But then again, who ever claimed that all Jews were smart?

 Israel’s problems with personal agendas pale in comparison with determining how to best deal with its neighbors.  Does relinquishing control of the Philadelphi corridor between the Sinai and Gaza to Egypt make sense?  Is it in Egypt’s interest to stop the smuggling of arms, or will Mubarak prefer to do just enough to satisfy the U.S., while ensuring that Israel still bleeds?  And there is a more fundamental question Israel has to ask.  Why does Egypt need billions of dollars worth of the latest U.S. weaponry if it has no external threats?

 Next door, Israel continues to enjoy a good security relationship with Jordan.  But with a majority Palestinian population, and an active Islamist movement, will the Hashemite kingdom remain stable and will King Abdullah be able to maintain his delicate balancing act?  There are surely no guarantees here either as to the future. 

 To the north, in Lebanon, Israel faces the threat of 12,000-15,000 rockets controlled by Hizbullah, which is actively aided by both Syria and Iran.  With an unstable and divided Lebanese government unable to enforce its authority over Hizbullah in the south, and with Syria “officially” out of Lebanon, what restraints are there on Hizbullah not to unleash its missiles?  At the same time, Bashar Assad’s rule in Damascus looks increasingly shaky with unforeseen consequences.  Is there opportunity or greater peril should the Assad dynasty come to an end?

 The above are some of the dilemmas the United States and Israel face in the near term.  For Israel, unfortunately, the challenges are more existential in nature than for the U.S., as some six million Jews seek to survive and prosper in a most inhospitable region.  With very few good options for policy-makers, the trick is to choose among the least worse ones.  Perhaps that is why the region should appropriately be called the Muddle East. 

Morrie Amitay is a former Executive Director of AIPAC and founder of the pro-Israel Washington PAC (www.washingtonpac.com).